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Editorial Freedom: Editors, Retailers,
and Access to the Mass Media
by MARK S. NADEL*
I
Introduction
Courts have long recognized that the freedom of the press
guaranteed by the first amendment protects the right to dis-
seminate messages' and includes a guarantee of "editorial dis-
cretion" or "freedom."2 Yet, no court has ever articulated
precisely which aspects of the communications process fall
within the scope of "editorial freedom."'3 The problems that
stem from this ambiguity are nowhere more apparent than
when cable television operators oppose government intrusion
into their decisionmaking by invoking their rights of editorial
freedom. In particular, cable operators have claimed that,
under the protective umbrella of the first amendment, they
possess both the right to transmit those messages they please
and the right to refuse to present those messages they find dis-
pleasing, for whatever reason.4
* Analyst, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress. This article was
written before the author took his present position, and it reflects solely his own opin-
ions, not those of OTA. B.A., Amherst College, 1978; J.D., Harvard University, 1981.
The author would like to thank Andrew Bernstein, Jonina Duker, Eugene Nadel, Eli
Noam, and Carl Oppedahl for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. First amendment freedom of expression protects the right to disseminate
messages irrespective of the identity of the speaker. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n of Cal., 106 S. Ct. 903, 907 (1986). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-2 to 12-33, at 580-731 (1978).
2. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) and
infra text accompanying notes 38-56.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 61-64.
4. For example, in opposing regulations which require cable operators to grant
access to their systems, cable operators have relied on Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), to argue that these rules abridge their editorial freedom.
See G. SHAPIRO, P. KURLAND & J. MERCURIO, CABLESPEECH 123 (1983) [hereinafter
SHAPIRO]; Lee, Cable Franchising and the First Amendment, 36 VAND. L. REV. 867,
918-19 n.215 (1983); See generally Goldberg, Ross & Spector, Cable Television, Gov-
ernment Regulation, and the First Amendment, 3 CoMM/ENT L.J. 577 (1981) [herein-
after Goldberg]. Counsels for media entities often try to use the first amendment
right of editorial freedom as a shield against any government regulation of the media,
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This article challenges the cable operators' position. It con-
tends that while editorial freedom is protected by the first
amendment, that right does not always include a right to pre-
vent others from gaining access to a cable system. In fact, a
precise definition of editorial freedom indicates that the right
to exclude or deny access to media derives from the property
rights found in the fifth amendment, and not from the first
amendment.6 This distinction is critical because property
rights do not have the preferred status of first amendment
rights'; they may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government to further the common good8 , such as to promote a
more open marketplace of ideas. To ignore this distinction re-
sults in a fundamental mischaracterization of the first
amendment.
This article provides a working definition of editorial free-
dom and explores the scope of its protection. It argues that edi-
torial freedom derives from the right of consumers to receive
information9 and, therefore, protects only editorial actions that
further that goal. 10 Only government regulation which inter-
regardless of whether such regulation directly affects their freedom of expression.
As former New York Times editor Lester Markel has observed, "[T]he press[,]...
asserting its near-infallibility, countenances no effective supervision of its operations;
it has a holier-than-thou attitude, citing the First Amendment and in addition the
Ten Commandments and other less holy scripture." Markel, Watching the Press,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1973, at 31, col. 5.
5. Among the cable television regulations that have been challenged in the name
of editorial freedom are the "must-carry" rules, see Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768
F.2d 1434, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986); rules mandating
exclusive franchise awards, see Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. United
States, 757 F.2d 1330, 1335-36 (D.C. Cir. 1985) and Preferred Communications, Inc. v.
Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985), remanded, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986); and
public access channel requirements, see Berkshire Cablevision, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F.
Supp. 976, 984-86 (D.R.I. 1983) vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985). Cable
industry attorneys also argue against leased access requirements. See, e.g., SHAPIRO,
supra note 4, at 77-135; Lee, supra note 4, at 913-20. See generally Goldberg, supra
note 4; S. 1917, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 130 CONG. REC. 13470 (1983); Gladstone, Taking
the First, CableVision, May 7, 1984, at 36-43.
6. In Nadel, A Unified Theory of the First Amendment: Divorcing the Medium
From the Message, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163 (1983), this commentator argued that
media owners have a right to exclude, but that it is purely a property right. That
analysis, however, did not address the question of whether editorial freedom might
include the right to exclude.
7. The fifth amendment states that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of ...
property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 65-73.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 85-107.
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feres with these functions should be found to abridge the first
amendment. By contrast, when cable operators seek the com-
plete exclusion of particular messages by denying others access
to their systems, consumers are prevented from receiving infor-
mation they desire.1 This does not facilitate effective commu-
nication; it hinders it. Thus, while other constitutional rights
may be implicated, such as those found in the fifth amend-
ment, the exclusion of messages is not protected by first
amendment "editorial freedom.'
12
This article does not attempt to determine whether access
regulations could be successfully challenged as violating other
aspects of the first amendment, such as freedom of expression
13
or freedom of association.14 Instead, because cable operators
have most commonly relied on "editorial freedom" as the foun-
dation of their claims, this article will focus on that issue. Any
discussion of related claims must await a future article.
5
Section II of this article describes the context in which the
debate over cable television access regulations has arisen. It be-
gins with a discussion of the fifth amendment's protection of
the right to exclude and the public policy that has been used to
justify access regulations which interfere with media owners'
right to exclude. It then discusses how cable owners have in-
terpreted the law to support a first amendment right to ex-
clude. This article then presents the thesis that the first
amendment protection of editorial freedom derives from the
consumer's right to receive information, and editorial freedom
should therefore be interpreted to protect only those activities
which help consumers receive information effectively.
Section III examines the concept of editorial freedom by ex-
ploring why editors are needed. After comparing the editorial
function to the general retailer function, it proposes that the
11. See infra text accompanying notes 65-73.
12. See supra note 4.
13. If any government regulation effectively repressed, or at least significantly
interfered with, the ability of a speaker to express his own ideas, it could be chal-
lenged as an abridgement of the general first amendment right to freedom of speech
and of the press. See supra note 1.
14. If access regulations forced media owners to provide access to others, but de-
nied them the ability to use effective disclaimer, then such regulations would violate
the freedom of association. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, 431 U.S. 209
(1977). See also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
15. The outline for an article disputing the relevance of freedom of association to
access regulations is provided in the Rehnquist dissent in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 106 S. Ct. 903, 920-22 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
19871
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first amendment should protect an editor's right to provide
three general editorial services similar to the services provided
by retailers: (1) searching, gathering, and specializing; (2) eval-
uating, labeling, and screening; and (3) organizing. The article
suggests that the first amendment protects editorial freedom
only to the extent that editors act to provide consumers with
these specific retail services.
Section IV applies this analytic framework to certain govern-
mental regulatory schemes that have been used or may be used
to facilitate access to cable television. It concludes that while
no regulations absolutely ban an editorial role for cable opera-
tors, some impose significant economic barriers which hinder
such a role and therefore abridge first amendment rights.
The article concludes that the must-carry rules,16 public ac-
cess channel requirements, 7 and awards of exclusive cable
franchises, 8 discussed further below, may all be crafted so as to
avoid abridging editorial freedom. Leased access require-
ments 9 are inherently designed that way. On the other hand,
both the fairness doctrine2° and right-of-reply statutes21 inter-
fere with editorial freedom and thereby abridge the first
amendment.
II
The Context of the Debate
A. The Right to Exclude and the Justification for Access
Regulations
1. The Fifth Amendment and the Right to Exclude
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the fifth
amendment protects certain private property rights2 2 and that
among "the essential sticks in the bundle of property rights is
the right to exclude others.' ' 23 Property owners have a general
16. See infra text accompanying notes 109-29.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 130-39.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 165-74.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 140-43.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 144-57.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 158-64.
22. See Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-28 (1978).
23. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980) (quoting Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979)). In PruneYard, the Supreme
Court found constitutional an interpretation of the California Constitution which re-
quired access to private shopping malls for free speech purposes. However, such ac-
[Vol. 9:213
MEDIA ACCESS AND EDITORIAL FREEDOM
right under the fifth amendment to exclude from their prop-
erty anyone and anything they desire.24 Yet, when market con-
ditions and public policy dictate that the government should
regulate the property rights of property owners, the courts
have permitted such regulation.2" As the Supreme Court
stated, "neither property rights nor contract rights are abso-
lute.... Equally fundamental with the private right is that of
the public to regulate it in the common interest."26
Owners of communications media historically were free to
exclude from their media any messages which they so chose.
Yet, as Professor Ithiel de Sola Pool observed, "[t]he traditional
law of a free press rest[ed] on the assumption that paper, ink,
and presses are in sufficient abundance that, if government
simply keeps hands off, people will be able to express them-
selves freely.
27
Today, however, the development of more efficient and
larger scale media technologies, such as cable television, has
given increased power to an increasingly small number of me-
dia outlets.2" Entry on a small scale is often no longer economi-
cally feasible. Today, effective and efficient mass media
communication is often controlled by those with greater re-
sources.2 By exercising their right to exclude material they
dislike, these media owners may effectively suppress the ex-
pression of others.
The ratification of the first amendment reflected the foun-
ders' concern about governmental efforts to suppress communi-
cations. However, as technology and mass communications
have evolved, suppression of ideas by private parties may be an
even greater danger.3 ° In response, some first amendment
cess was neither compelled nor prohibited by the first amendment. Nor did it violate
the fifth amendment protections against taking of property without due process of
law. This article makes no attempt to address protection which may be extended to
cable operators through state constitutions.
24. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
25. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md, 437 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1978).
26. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. at 84-85 (quoting Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934)). See also Railway Express Agency v. New York,
336 U.S. 106 (1949).
27. I. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 106 (1983).
28. Id. at 4-5, 11-12.
29. See B. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (1983); J. BARRON, FREEDOM THE
PRESS FOR WHOM? (1973).
30. Public Agenda Foundation analyst Daniel Yanklovich has concluded from his
surveys that many Americans are more concerned that the media, not government,
1987]
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scholars have articulated the need for an effective right of ac-
cess to the privately controlled mass media in order to maintain
the open communications sought by the founding fathers. In a
1967 article, Jerome Barron argued that the first amendment
supports a right of access to the print media;31 however, this
idea has failed to gain wide acceptance. 32 In the broadcast me-
dium, development of the "fairness" doctrine33 was seen as a
means of assuring a diversity of points of view. Yet, in recent
years, scholars have become disillusioned with the doctrine,
believing that it chills the expression of broadcasters to an un-
constitutional degree.34
Many public policy analysts who studied the issue in the
1970s began to believe that cable television would resolve the
access problem. With its virtually unlimited channel capacity,
33
cable increased the possibility that the government could re-
frain from regulating other more scarce media resources, espe-
cially broadcasting. A 1971 report by the Sloan Commission on
Cable Communications 36 concluded that cable television repre-
sented an abundant new resource which could serve the needs
of everyone. Many of the major cable studies of the 1970s sug-
gested that private cable television systems should be required
to serve public policy goals by acting as passive carriers for the
may restrict freedom of expression. See F. ROWAN, BROADCAST FAIRNESS: DOCTRINE,
PRACTICE, PROSPECTS 90 (1984).
31. See Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1641, 1667-69 (1967).
32. This idea has gained some support, however. See infra note 53.
33. See generally Inquiry into § 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regula-
tions Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees,
FCC 85-459, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d. (P&F) 1337, 102 F.C.C. 2d 143 (1985) (discussing the
effects of recent developments on the doctrine); SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 0-54 (1983).
This discussion of the fairness doctrine is introduced here to demonstrate growing
concern over the need for access to the media. However, the broadcast medium has
historically been seen as being in a unique regulatory posture because it uses the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum - a scarce resource. See Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969). Although the fairness doctrine technically applies to cable, in practice
it has never been applied. In fact, the FCC is reconsidering the justification for apply-
ing these rules to cable and exploring possible alternatives. Fairness Doctrine and
Political Cablecasting Requirements, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, M.M. Docket
83-130 (1983). However, the Commission is unlikely to change its position.
34. Id.
35. Although a single coaxial cable might only be able to carry twelve, twenty-
four, or fifty-four television channels, a cable system owner could construct a system
with two, three, or more cables. The only constraints are economic: consumer de-
mand and construction costs.
36. SLOAN COMMISSION OF CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE: THE TELEVI-
SION OF ABUNDANCE (1971) [hereinafter SLOAN].
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programming of others on at least some of the systems'
channels.37
2. The First Amendment and the Right to Exclude
While governments and others saw cable as a valuable public
resource, cable television system owners did not want to relin-
quish any control over access to their media. Even if the fifth
amendment did not prohibit the government from interfering
with their private property right to exclude, cable owners rea-
soned that perhaps the first amendment would do so. Relying
primarily on Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,8 the
cable television industry responded to access rules by asserting
that regulations requiring them to grant others access to their
medium abridged their editorial freedom.39
In Tornillo, the Supreme Court held that Florida's right-of-
reply statute violated the first amendment because it interfered
with the editorial discretion exercised by editors. That statute
provided that if a newspaper assailed a candidate's character or
record, the candidate could demand that the newspaper print a
reply of equal prominence and space. As the Court explained
later,4 ° the Florida statute "exact[ed] a penalty on the basis of
the content of a newspaper, "41 and thus there was a danger that
the statute would "dampe[n] the vigor and limi[t] the variety of
public debate. ' 42 The Court's unanimous decision concluded
that "[iut has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regula-
tion . . .can be exercised consistent with First Amendment
guarantees....
Cable owners interpreted Tornillo as prohibiting the govern-
ment from imposing any right of access to any communications
medium, asserting that any such access right would necessarily
intrude into the role of editors." Cable television system own-
ers used this argument successfully when they challenged the
governmental regulations requiring them to retransmit the
37. See Nadel, Cablespeech for Whom? 4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 51, 70 n.104
(1985).
38. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
39. See supra note 4.
40. The Tornillo decision was distinguished and explained by the Court in
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
41. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 88 (quoting Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256).
42. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 88 (quoting Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257).
43. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
44. See supra note 4.
1987]
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signals of local off-air television broadcast stations.45 In addi-
tion, they have asserted it in litigation involving exclusive
cable television franchises 46 and public access cable channels,
47
discussed in some detail below.
4
The 1986 Supreme Court decision in Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California49 may lend
support to the cable industry position. That case involved a
California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) decision which
required the plaintiff utility to include the editorial material of
an opposition group in a number of the PUC's billing enve-
lopes.50 Although the plurality opinion relied most heavily on
the first amendment's freedom of expression and a finding of
content-based discrimination,5' the opinion offered a broad in-
terpretation of Tornillo, reiterating that a "[g]overnment en-
forced right of access inescapably 'dampens the vigor and
limits the variety of public debate.' ",52
Nevertheless, many commentators have suggested that
Tornillo be interpreted more narrowly.53 In spite of Tornillo
and its progeny, rights of access have been upheld by the
Supreme Court in a number of other contexts where they have
been found not to dampen the vigor or limit the variety of pub-
lic debate. In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,54 the
Court held that the state of California could interpret its own
constitution to require the owner of a private shopping center
45. See Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1452-53 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986).
46. See Preferred Communications v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1406-07
(9th Cir. 1985), remanded, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986).
47. See Berkshire Cablevision of R.I. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 982-86 (D.R.I.
1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985).
48. See infra text accompanying notes 165-74 & 130-39, respectively.
49. 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986).
50. Id. at 914.
51. Id. at 910-12.
52. Id. at 908 (quoting Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257) (emphasis in original).
53. See F. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 334 (1981); M. NIMMER,
NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT
§ 4.09(D)(2)(c), 4-132 to 4-134 (1984); B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC
ACCESS 12-14 (1976); Blasi, The Chiecking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 627-28; Nadel, Electrifying the First Amendment, 5 CARDOZO
L. REV. 531, 536 (1984). See also Price, Taming Red Lion: The First Amendment and
Structural Approaches to Media Regulation, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 215, 222-23 (1979).
Others, like Harvard Law School professors Archibald Cox and Laurence Tribe, go
even further, believing that the Tornillo decision should have been decided against
the media owner. (Personal conversations, Spring, 1981).
54. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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to open his forum to leafletters. 5 A year later, in CBS, Inc. v.
FCC,5 1 the Court upheld a statute granting political candidates
access to broadcast stations against a challenge based on edito-
rial discretion. In neither case did the Court express the con-
cern that the access rules would dampen the vigor of public
debate.
Interpreting the first amendment as protecting the right to
exclude persons from gaining access to a cable system would
essentially turn the amendment on its head. A right to exclude
messages completely could enable private media owners to sup-
press messages of which they disapproved. The goal of the
marketplace would thus be thwarted. The right of the property
owner to exclude others where the property in question is a
medium of mass communications may be regulated just like
any other property.57 As long as the governmentally-required
access does not rise to the level of becoming a "taking" under
the fifth amendment, or is compensated by the government or
the party granted access, the fifth amendment is not
infringed.58
In such a case, the social goal of facilitating open communica-
tion outweighs the private property right of the individual me-
dia owner.59 While the first amendment prohibits the
suppression of messages by the government, it should not be
read as prohibiting the government from promoting communi-
cation consistent with the first amendment through carefully
crafted rules that permit individuals to gain occasional access to
the most economically efficient mass media.60 Those individu-
als who are willing to pay the market rate for access to the
mass media should not be left to the mercy of large media own-
ers who could suppress ideas by refusing to disseminate them.
Against this background, it is unclear which aspects of the
editorial discretion exercised by cable television system owners
are protected by the first amendment. Courts have failed to
articulate the boundaries of editorial freedom. In fact, in Pre-
55. Id.
56. 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
57. Regulations could be justified by the strong governmental interest in facilitat-
ing wide-open communication. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87.
58. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
59. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 82-83.




ferred Communications v. City of Los Angeles,6 Quincy Cable
TV v. FCC,2 and Berkshire v. Burke, 3 discussed in more detail
below,64 the Supreme Court and three courts of appeals either
sidestepped the editorial discretion issue, or simply assumed
that a regulation interfered with the freedom without explain-
ing why. The need for a workable definition of editorial free-
dom is thus of growing importance.
B. Editorial Freedom and the Right to Receive Information
The right to receive information has been recognized by the
Supreme Court as a paramount aspect of the first amendment.
In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumers Council, 5 the Supreme Court said, "Freedom of
speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker ex-
ists.., the protection afforded is to the communication, to its
source and to its recipients both. '66 Most recently, in Pacific
Gas & Electric v. California Public Utilities Commission,7 the
Court added that "[t]he constitutional guarantee of free speech
'serves significant societal interests' wholly apart from the
speaker's interest in self-expression .... [T]he First Amend-
ment protects the public's interest in receiving information.
68
These positions of the Court followed directly from two prior
important first amendment cases. In Time Inc. v. Hill,6 9 the
Court recognized that "[the first amendment] guarantees are
not for the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of all
of us."70  In the seminal case of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC,71 the Court emphasized, "It is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is para-
mount."72  As first amendment absolutist Justice William
Douglas noted, "The press has a preferred position in our con-
stitutional scheme, not to enable it to make money, not to set
newsmen apart as a favored class, but to bring fulfillment to
61. 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), remanded, 106 S. Ct. 2034.
62. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986).
63. 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985).
64. See infra text accompanying notes 165-71, 109-13 & 132, respectively.
65. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
66. Id. at 756.
67. 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986).
68. Id. at 907.
69. 385 U.S. 374 (1966).
70. Id. at 389.
71. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
72. Id. at 390.
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the public's right to know. '7 3
One might regard the right to receive information as the de-
mand side of the first amendment, where the general right to
disseminate information represents the supply side. This arti-
cle contends that the first amendment protects editorial free-
dom as part of its demand side. In protecting a consumer's
right to receive information, the first amendment protects a
consumer's right to receive information effectively. The first
amendment must therefore protect the right of consumers to
utilize the editorial services they desire. Any government regu-
lations that interfere with an editor's ability to provide services
which enhance a consumer's ability to receive information, or
which make the provision of editorial services economically
burdensome to provide, abridge the editorial discretion pro-
tected by the first amendment. The following section presents
the basis for this thesis and examines the specific editorial serv-
ices that editors provide.
II
Retailers and Editors
A. The Need for Editors
To determine which aspects of the editorial process the first
amendment should protect as part of editorial freedom, it is im-
portant to understand the role editors play in society. Individu-
als need editors because more messages are produced than any
single individual can possibly see or hear.74 Millions of news
articles, tens of thousands of feature stories, and thousands of
books are written annually.75 Multitudes of new television pro-
grams and motion pictures are produced and distributed.76 As
one commentator has observed:
We are drowning in information .... Some [s]cientists
73. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). For a
more detailed discussion of this right, see generally Emerson, Legal Foundations of
the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1976); Note, The Right to Receive Informa-
tion and Ideas Willingly Offered: First Amendment Protection for the Communica-
tion Process, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 497 (1979).
74. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975). According to
psychologists, the human mind would be overwhelmed with the abundance of stimuli
with which we come in contact if the brain did not develop internal editing "schemas"
to decide what to perceive and what to ignore. D. GOLEMAN, VITAL LIES, SIMPLE
TRUTHS 79-82 (1985).




[even] ... complain of information pollution and charge that it
takes less time to do an experiment than to find out whether
or not it has already been done.... If users ... can locate the
information they need, they will pay for it. The emphasis of
the whole information society shifts, then, from supply to
selection.77
Without the help of editors, consumers simply could not sort
through the millions of items of information produced daily.
The editors of U.S. News & World Report capture the point in
their advertising: "With US News anything worth missing is al-
ready missing," and "We give you the cream. Not the skim.
'78
The consumer's task of selecting among messages is similar
to the process of searching or shopping for other types of goods
or services in our society. Whenever there are large numbers
of items differing in price and quality, a consumer must make
subjective judgments about what to buy.79 Yet individuals do
not have enough time or money to evaluate the price and qual-
ity of every available choice for every purchase they make. 0
Therefore, even those consumers who are only moderately par-
ticular in their preferences must still seek some source of infor-
mation about the offerings.
The most common sources of such information are prior ex-
perience, 1 advertising, 2 peers, and experts.8 3 However, at vari-
77. J. NAISBITT, MEGATRENDS: TEN NEW DIRECTIONS TRANSFORMING OUR LIVES
24 (1982) (emphasis in original). See also Owen, The Role of Print in an Electronic
Society, in COMMUNICATIONS FOR TOMORROW: POLICY PERSPECTIVES FOR THE 1980's
230 (G. Robinson ed. 1978):
A second feature of the print media is that they typically supply a high
level of editorial service. That is, people are willing to pay something to
avoid the task of sifting data for themselves and editors compete for the read-
ership market by compiling packages that suit the tastes of individuals. In-
deed, in the Age of Information, editors assume an even greater importance;
people will pay not to be deluged with unedited data.
Id. at 230.
78. See, e.g., ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 10, 1984, at 19.
79. See, e.g., Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 224
(1961). Furthermore, that choice is becoming ever more difficult. See, e.g., Belkin,
Shopping Is Getting Much More Complicated, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1985, at Al, col. 1:
There are nearly 300 long-distance telephone companies in the United
States today, and 23 kinds of Nine Lives cat food. Revlon makes 157 shades of
lipstick (41 of them pink) and Tower Video offers 5,000 video cassettes for
sale or rent. The Love drugstore chain carries 41 varieties of hair mousse.
80. Search is expensive. See J. ENGEL, D. KOLLAT & R. BLACKWELL, CONSUMER
BEHAVIOR 238 (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter J. ENGEL]; M. PORTER, INTERBRAND CHOICE,
STRATEGY, AND BILATERAL MARKET POWER 20-22, 101-04 (1976).
81. See J. ENGEL sup'ra note 80, at 239; M. PORTER supra note 80 at 99, 110-11; P.
Kotter, Marketing Management 482-87 (5th ed. 1984). If they could not depend on
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ous times and for a variety of reasons, these sources may not
provide adequate assistance. In such situations, consumers may
rely on the explicit or implicit decisions and recommendations
of the retailers serving the particular market.84
B. The Services Provided by Retailers and Editors
Using information from competing suppliers and feedback
from their customers, retailers are generally knowledgeable
about the products they offer for sale. 5 As a result, they are
able to provide consumers with many valuable services. These
services, discussed below, can be placed into three categories:
(1) searching, gathering, and specializing; (2) evaluating, label-
ing, and screening; and (3) organizing.
Editors, in effect, act as retailers of messages, 86 performing
these same services when they select from among the multi-
tude of available messages the relatively few with which to
compose a magazine, radio program, film festival, library, or
high school history curriculum.87 Since consumers of informa-
brand loyalty, even the best producers could find it difficult to sell their high quality
products. The acclaimed novelist Doris Lessing demonstrated the impact of prior ex-
perience in the media when two novels she wrote under a pseudonym were rejected
even by her longtime British publisher. See McDowell, Doris Lessing Says She Used
Pen Name to Show New Writers' Difficulties, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1984, § 1, at 45,
col. 1.
82. See M. PORTER supra note 80, at 235-37; F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 376-80 (2d ed. 1980). See also Bates v. State
Bar of Az., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) ("The consumer's concern for the free flow of
commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political
dialogue").
83. Consumers often seek advice from family or friends who have personal expe-
rience with the product or rely on the opinions of others, particularly those with simi-
lar needs or tastes. See M. PORTER, supra note 80, at 99-100; J. ENGEL, supra, note 80,
at 278-81. Frequently, valuable assistance is also available from the expert critics
who exist in almost every product market. See Eovaldi, The Market For Consumer
Product Evaluations: An Analysis and a Proposal, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1235, 1237-39
(1985).
84. See M. PORTER, supra note 80, at 21-22.
85. One writer has identified retailers with knowledge of their products as being
in the "nonconvenience goods" business. Those offering little information to consum-
ers and carrying primarily well-advertised brand name products are identified as be-
ing in the "convenience goods" business. M. PORTER, supra note 80, at 136.
86. This is not surprising when one observes that the verb edit is derived from the
Latin word edere, meaning to put forth. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
817 (2d ed. 1956).
87. See E. DENNIS & J. MERRILL, BASIC ISSUES IN MASS COMMUNICATION 138, 139
(1984) (identifying a marketing approach as the most effective way to select news of
interest to the audience). "For as long as anyone can remember, editors ... have
decided what will grace the pages of newspapers or appear on newscasts and what will
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tion need these editorial services to receive information effec-
tively, the first amendment must protect editors' ability to
provide them.
As shown below, the ability to exclude completely is not criti-
cal to either the retail or editorial process. Indeed,, the right to
exclude is positively disfavored in the editorial process, since by
excluding, the editor is suppressing communication by, and to,
others. Both editors and retailers provide a highly valued
screening service to those who desire it, but that service can,
and often is, provided without excluding and suppressing items
that other consumers might desire. This is achieved by the use
of a number of creative alternatives-in particular, labeling less
desirable items as less desirable.
1. Searching, Gathering and Specializing
Most retailers begin by searching in their chosen product
market for those items which appeal to a particular target audi-
ence. They then gather the selected items together in some
convenient location. 8
A retailer may try to serve everyone in a particular geo-
graphic market by offering a standard selection of products
which are at least minimally satisfactory to almost everyone in
that market. Thus, the owner of the only clothing store in a
community often finds it most profitable to offer a standard se-
lection of items. Similarly, the only doctor or lawyer in a small
town is normally a general practitioner. Even when a retailer
is not the sole provider in a market, but is the second or third
retailer entering the field, he or she may still find it most prof-
itable to serve the mass market.89
In other instances, however, a retailer will find it more prof-
itable to specialize by focusing on a narrow target audience.90
By specializing, a retailer can concentrate on gathering items of
not. They have engaged in a hard selection process, elevating some items to impor-
tance and public exposure while relegating others to the wastebasket." Id. at 139.
88. See J. ENGEL, supra note 80, at 43.
89. See Wildman & Owen, Program Competition, Diversity, and Multichannel
Bundling in the New Video Industry, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION: REGULATION,
ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY 244 (E. Noam ed. 1985).
90. See M. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUS-
TRIES AND COMPETITORS 38-40 (1980). The strategy is also called segmentation. See J.
MASON & M. MAYER, MODERN RETAILING THEORY AND PRACTICE 134 (1978) ("Seg-
mentation involves subdividing the market and then tailoring products and/or
messages for all or a subset of the segments thus identified"). See also P. KOTTER,
supra note 81, at 250-76.
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interest for those with specialized tastes and can offer more
variations on their favorite themes.9' Specialization permits
consumers to receive superior service for their specialized
needs.
While specialists might exclude items that do not fit their im-
age, the need to exclude such items is neither necessary nor
very important to the retail service. This is because retailers
can generally expand to carry as much inventory as they find it
profitable to sell.92 If they have sufficient space, they need not
exclude one profitable product to make room for another; both
can be carried. While expansion at a given location might often
be extremely difficult, such expansion is usually possible if it is
justified by the prices received for the goods sold in the added
space.
Media editors operate in a similar fashion. The only newspa-
per in a town generally tries to offer something for everyone
and to avoid offending any one group, advertisers in particu-
lar.93 However, when many competitors can be supported, as is
91. See, e.g., Hopkins, Born to Shop, NEW YORK MAGAZINE 42, 44 (June 16, 1986).
(" 'Barney's just got too popular too fast,' he complains. 'They edit too much for my
taste. I want to do my own editing of the designers.' "); Kanner, Toying Around.-
F.A.O. Goes Shopping, NEW YORK MAGAZINE 22 (Mar. 9, 1987) ("We edit for our
customers").
92. If expansion is sufficiently profitable to permit the retailer to pay the cost of
constructing or leasing additional space from neighbors, and still leave some money
left over, then a normal profit maximizing retailer is likely to expand to raise profits.
93. In the newspaper industry this strategy was first pursued by the penny press
publishers who "positioned their products toward the great masses of the community
.... [T]he penny press also welcomed all advertisers as contributing to the new demo-
cratic spirit." J. TUROW, MEDIA INDUSTRIES: THE PRODUCTION OF NEWS AND EN-
TERTAINMENT 120-21 (1984).
As the late communications professor Ithiel de Sola Pool observed:
Newspapers, as they moved into the status of monopolies, had the wisdom
to defuse hostility by acting in many respects like a common carrier.... [To-
day] they not only run columnists of opposite tendency and open their local
news pages willingly to community groups, but also encourage letters to the
editor. Most important of all, they accept advertising for pay from anyone.
Only rarely does a newspaper refuse an ad on grounds of disagreement.
I. POOL, supra note 27 at 238. See also I. POOL, id. at 19; P. SANDMAN, D. RUBIN & D.
SACHSMAN, MEDIA: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN MASS COMMUNICA-
TIONS 104, 137-48 (3d ed. 1982).
Even where there are three major competitors, the commercial television networks
compete for the mass market, therefore offering "lowest common denominator" pro-
grams. See 1 NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, FINAL REPORT: NEW TELEVISION
NETWORKS: ENTRY, JURISDICTION, OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION 35 (1980).
In advertiser-supported television, since payments by advertisers are based
solely on the number and characteristics of viewers attracted to a program,
there may be a tendency for an excessive "sameness" of programs, especially
COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 9:213
the case with national magazines, theaters, book stores, and ra-
dio stations in large cities, increasing degrees of specialization
are possible.94 By providing dozens of competing video chan-
nels, cable television has spawned the development of many
specialized cable networks.95
In radio and television broadcasting, the right to exclude is
important to the ability to specialize, because the products a
station can offer are limited to those which will fit into a
twenty-four hour day. However, in the print and cable media,
where capacity is not so limited,9 6 specialization can occur with-
out a right to exclude. Thus, there is no reason for cable or
print editors to exclude information where it is not unprofita-
when the number of networks and stations is small. The most profitable pol-
icy for each of a small number of networks may be to attempt to capture a
share of the mass audience by "duplicating" each of the others' programming,
i.e., by providing programs very similar to those shown by the others.
Id. See also The Vast Wasteland, address by Newton N. Minow, then FCC Chairman,
to the National Association of Broadcasters (May 9, 1961), reprinted in DOCUMENTS
OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 281 (F. Kahn ed. 1978). Former NBC executive Paul
Klein has suggested that lowest common denominator programming occurs because
the networks recognize that television viewers will usually watch the program they
are tuned to unless they find it objectionable. Therefore, they try to provide the least
objectionable programming they can. Klein, The Television Audience and Program
Mediocrity, in MASS MEDIA AND SOCIETY 74-77 (A. Wells ed. 1979).
94. As the FCC has observed about the radio medium:
[I]n the early days of radio, it was essential that a few stations provide a
broad general service. Today, however, it has become essential in view of the
proliferation of radio stations and other broadcast services that radio licen-
sees specialize to attract an audience so that they may remain financially
viable.
Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, para. 2 (1981) (cited in
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1434 (D.C.Cir. 1983)). See also J. Bar-
ron, Specialty Bookshops: A Browser's Guide, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1984, at CI, col. 2.
In New York City, there are enough legitimate theaters to lead them to specialize.
95. There are now networks devoted solely to movies (e.g., Home Box Office
(HBO)), news (Cable News Network (CNN)), congressional debate (Cable Satellite
Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN)), and even separate networks for different styles
of music ( e.g., Music Television (MTV) and The Nashville Network (TNN)). Chan-
nels 1987 Field Guide 73, 81 (Dec. 1986).
96. In the absence of war-time rationing, publishers have access to as much paper
to print as many pages in each edition as they desire. Their only real constraint is the
price of paper and printing and delivery costs. Cable television system owners are in a
similar situation. They can construct or upgrade systems to whatever capacity they
are willing to pay for. Even when it is said that there is a limited amount of duct space
available underground or a limited amount of capacity on telephone poles, it is always
possible for new ducts or telephone poles to be installed, albeit at a very high price.
Thus, again, the real constraint is not physical capacity, but economic cost.
Spectrum capacity is also not actually as physically limited as most people think.
See sources listed in Nadel, supra note 53, at 541 n.62.
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ble because there is no limit on the amount of pages or chan-
nels being used.
Thus, it is extremely rare for print publications to refuse a
timely advertisement due to a lack of space. The publication
can simply add pages as long as the price charged to the adver-
tiser earns the publisher a profit. Although it is somewhat
more complicated and time-consuming for a cable television
system owner to add additional channels, such expansion can
always be undertaken if the user is willing to cover the cost of
the capacity.
2. Evaluating, Labeling, and Screening
Some consumers are content once the retailer has gathered
his or her products into a single location,9 7 but most expect ad-
ditional service. They depend on the retailer to evaluate the
quality of each product that might be offered. Retailers pro-
vide this service in the way they handle potentially dangerous
products, establish quality standards, and endorse particular
products. By carefully identifying products, retailers can en-
able consumers to avoid unwanted products without entirely
excluding products that others may find desirable.
(a) Potentially Offensive Products
Retailers provide a preliminary screening service by identify-
ing dangerous or potentially offensive products. In some pro-
duct markets the government also provides this service by
requiring warnings to be placed on specific products. While
such products may be excluded by some retailers or the govern-
ment," labeling permits the potentially offensive or dangerous
products to remain available to those consumers who want
them, while enabling those who prefer to avoid them to do so.
In addition, retailers will offer them if consumers are willing to
make it profitable for them to do so.
Editors provide a similar service. Instead of excluding all
adult films, theater owners can provide consumers with compa-
rable protection through screening and rating films.9 Some
97. These are consumers who desire convenience goods. See supra note 85.
98. For example, the Food and Drug Administration bans the sale of drugs that
are considered to be "imminent hazards." 21 C.F.R. § 2.5 (1986). Individual states ban
the provision of professional services by any who do not meet minimum licensing
standards. See Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J.L. & ECON. 93 (1961).
99. Hollywood studios can also use ratings for this purpose. For example, Walt
1987]
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potentially offensive materials raise different first amendment
issues, since they may fall within a category of unprotected
speech.1 °° But where material falls short of being obscene,101
other screening services enable editors to protect or warn con-
sumers without entirely excluding the materials. Thus, adult
television programs are usually broadcast late in the evening
and are often preceded by explicit notices that the material
may be offensive to some viewers.0 2 Cable television editors
have the technological screening tool of the lock-out device by
which consumers can ensure that certain channels are not re-
ceived in their homes.'0 3 This device allows cable editors to
segregate potentially offensive programming onto clearly iden-
tified channels for those who desire it, while also protecting
those who do not.
(b) Minimum Quality Standards and Endorsements
Generally, retailers have minimum quality standards for the
products they carry. This permits consumers to shop with
confidence. Consumers seeking quality assurances who are un-
able to rely on brand names may rely on high quality retailers.
Retailers may also recommend specific products. A retailer can
make its endorsement explicit or subtle, for example, by posi-
tioning products in store windows or other less prominent
locations. Retailers may also make individualized recommen-
dations based on a customer's known tastes.
While a retailer's reputation for its personal taste and quality
Disney wanted to expand into the production of "R" rated adult films, without damag-
ing its reputation for producing wholesome family films. To maintain its traditional
Disney quality standard while also producing films that did not meet those standards,
it marketed its new category of films under a different name: Touchstone. See Mul-
tichannel News, Feb. 27, 1984, at 6, col. 1 By the use of such distinct labeling, Disney
has been able to retain its reputation and still offer material that would not meet the
former Disney standard.
100. The issue of obscenity and the first amendment questions it raises are beyond
the scope of this article.
101. While an exact definition of obscenity is impossible, the Supreme Court has
set out a three-part test to use in identifying such materials. See Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973).
102. See, e.g., T. GITLIN, INSIDE PRIME TIME 58 (1983).
103. Thus, section 624 (d)(2)(A) of the 1984 Cable Act, 47 U.S.C. 44 § 624 (d)(2)(A)
(1984), states that:
In order to restrict the viewing of programming which is obscene or inde-
cent, upon the request of a subscriber, a cable operator shall provide (by sale
or lease) a device by which the subscriber can prohibit viewing of a particular
cable service during periods selected by that subscriber.
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standards may be one of its most valuable assets,10 4 many high
quality retailers stop short of excluding all items that do not
meet their standards. This is because retailers realize that
their reputations need not be compromised by carrying such
products if they identify the products clearly. If it is suffi-
ciently profitable to distribute inferior quality goods, such re-
tailers will voluntarily do so, indicating that absolute exclusion
is not a necessary component of the screening service which
they provide.
Thus, food stores with reputations for fresh food may offer
low-priced "day old" products. High class clothing stores may
offer carefully marked "imperfects" or "seconds" in a "bargain
basement." These retailers recognize that they can retain their
reputation and credibility as long as they carefully identify
lower quality items as such. Absolute exclusion of such items is
unnecessary.
Similarly, consumers of information are often concerned
about the quality of available material. They turn to a specific
newspaper because they know it carries the highest quality fi-
nancial information available, or to a specific television channel
for credible news reporting.
However, editors, like retailers, need not exclude all material
of which they do not approve in order to maintain their quality
standards. Newspapers that carefully cultivate reputations for
high-quality, objective news also include advertisements, let-
ters-to-the-editor, and guest editorials over which the editors
do not exercise the same amount of quality control. Rather, by
clearly identifying these materials as the viewpoints of others,
newspapers are able to maintain their own quality and editorial
standards without excluding the viewpoints of others. Editors
also effectively utilize disclaimers to aid consumers of their in-
formation. 1 5 Disclaimers are usually implicit when a medium
carries advertisements or letters-to-the- editor. However, there
are also explicit disclaimers, including those made in the clos-
104. A retailer's good will is legally recognized as property. See Levitt Corp v. Lev-
itt, 593 F.2d 463, 468 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S.
403, 412-13 (1916); Clairol, Inc. v. Asaro, 1975 Trade Cas. 60, 305 at 66, 473 (E.D. Mich.
1975).
105. In Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 106 S. Ct. 903, 911
n.11 (1986), Justice Powell admitted that "[tihe disclaimer ... serves . . . to avoid
giving readers the mistaken impression that [the access recipient's] words are really
those of [the media owner]."
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ing credits of certain television programs.106
3. Organizing
Finally, retailers organize the items they offer. While the
serendipity of a flea market is often refreshing, 10 7 most con-
sumers prefer locating desired products quickly and easily.
Therefore, most retailers arrange their items in some logical
fashion, for example, by department, size, style, or brand, and
may also provide directories.
Editors provide similar organizing services. A sports maga-
zine may place its statistics in the same place in every issue and
a fashion magazine may index its beauty tips or fashion fea-
tures. Classified ads, the yellow pages, and books in a book
store are normally organized by subject. When specialized re-
tailers are not affiliated with each other, an independent firm
may provide the directory. For example, TV Guide and local
newspapers identify their choices of the best movies, new tele-
vision programs, or sporting events for a given day or week.
These services save consumers time and trouble and thereby
help consumers receive information effectively. The provision
of organizing services should therefore be a protected part of
editorial discretion.
4. Summary
Editors provide to consumers of messages the same general
categories of service that retailers in other markets provide to
their customers: (1) searching, gathering, and specializing; (2)
evaluating, labeling, and screening; and (3) organizing. Since
the first amendment protects the right of consumers to receive
information, and consumers require these editorial services to
receive information effectively, the first amendment should
protect the right of consumers to receive these services from
editors and the editorial freedom of editors to provide them.
Editors can provide the editorial services protected by the
first amendment without having the right to completely ex-
clude certain messages. The exercise of the editorial functions
106. The Nightly Business Report, produced by television station WPBT in Miami
and distributed by the Public Broadcasting System (PBS) network, concludes each
program with the message that the opinions expressed by its guests are their own and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the producers, WPBT, or the station.
107. See J. ENGEL, supra note 80; P. Rose, Hers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1984 at C2,
col. 1. (discussing the fun of shopping in flea markets).
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described above diminishes the need for the complete exclusion
of undesired, potentially offensive or lower quality materials.
Since total exclusion of messages does not help consumers re-
ceive information, and exclusion may actually suppress the
communication of others, the first amendment should not pro-
tect it as part of editorial freedom. Thus, government regula-
tions that prevent media owners from excluding messages
should not be held to be unconstitutional abridgements of edi-
torial freedom.
The following section discusses a number of media access
regulations that have been challenged as interfering with edito-
rial discretion. The constitutionality of each is evaluated ac-
cording to whether it hinders the editor's ability to provide any
of the editorial services discussed above.
IV
The Constitutionality of Alternative
Access Schemes
Editorial freedom is abridged by a regulation only if that reg-
ulation hinders the editor's ability to provide one or more of the
editorial services discussed above. This framework can be ap-
plied to a number of the most significant rules regulating access
to the media, including the "must-carry" rules, public and
leased (common carrier) access schemes, the fairness doctrine,
right-of-reply statutes, and rules mandating exclusive cable
franchise awards. These rules have their greatest effect on the
specialization and screening services which media owners offer.
The analysis proposed in this article may be relevant to other
communications media. However, most of the recent contro-
versy over access regulation involves cable television systems.
In discussing the constitutionality of government access
schemes, it is helpful to review the editorial services that cable
system operators normally provide.
A. The Services Provided by Cable Editors
Cable operators/editors begin by searching through the myr-
iad of national and regional video satellite networks, audio net-
works, distant broadcast signals, information services, video
cassette, and locally produced programming to select the set of
messages which they consider most appealing to the specialized
1987]
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tastes of their local markets."' 8 Based on their analyses of prod-
ucts and local market demand, cable operators/editors con-
struct a cable system capable of carrying all the services which
they find desirable and economically practical to offer.
Having gathered their chosen program services on their sys-
tem, cable operators/editors generally provide their subscribers
with evaluations, identifications, and recommendations in the
form of a cable guide. The guide may be displayed on a chan-
nel, but it is usually printed and mailed to subscribers and re-
sembles TV Guide. The guide describes the offerings on each
channel as well as providing more detailed descriptions and
recommendations of particular movies or programs. In the
guide, cable operators may suggest that subscribers watch a
program or avoid another. They might even describe an adult
movie in both ways. For example, "Do not let your children
under sixteen see this film, but if you like erotica you should
not miss it."
Cable operators provide an organizational service by compil-
ing lists of sporting events, comedy programs, special movies, or
other programming offered during a month. Such lists save
subscribers from having to peruse the entire monthly program
guide themselves.
B. Access Regulations
Specific access rules can now be examined to determine
whether they interfere with the protected editorial services
provided by cable system operators.
1. The Must-Carry Rules
Prior to their repeal in Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC,10 9 the
FCC's must-carry rules required a cable system owner to carry
the signals of all local broadcast stations."0 The rules thereby
108. See supra note 95.
109. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986).
110. The mandatory signal carriage rules were promulgated in First Report and
Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, paras. 710-14 (1965) (codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.51-76.65 (1984)).
The FCC imposed them out of fear that cable systems would cause such economic
harm to broadcasters that the latter would be unable to afford to meet their public
service obligations and those not subscribing to cable would be deprived of important
information. 38 F.C.C. at 710-14. More recent economic reports, however, have raised
some doubts about these conclusions. See Inquiry into the Economic Relationship Be-
tween Television Broadcasting and Cable Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632 (1979) (discussed
in Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1455-59 (1985)).
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ensured that local broadcasters had access to cable subscribers.
When the rules were challenged, however, the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia struck them down as violat-
ing the first amendment because: (1) the FCC had not
demonstrated that the rules served an important or substantial
governmental interest;111 and (2) the rules were not narrowly
tailored to impose a restriction no greater than that necessary
to further the articulated interest.112
While the court was careful to marshal the evidence that jus-
tified these conclusions, it was more cursory in its review of
how the rules interfered with the first amendment rights of
cable operators. It noted only that "[w]e need not decide
whether the cable operator's editorial discretion is of the same
order as that of a broadcaster or a newspaper .... We have no
doubt, however, that it is of sufficient magnitude to implicate
the First Amendment.'
1 3
Under the framework proposed here, the former must-carry
rules would not appear to interfere with the provision of any
editorial service by the cable operator and hence would not
abridge the first amendment. The rules would interfere with
protected editorial discretion only if they imposed a significant
financial burden on those who sought to provide such services.
A significant cost could discourage editors from providing edi-
torial services or cause them to increase the price to consumers,
thereby depriving some consumers of the higher-priced
services.
(a) Searching, Gathering, and Specializing
Superficially, the must-carry rules appear to inhibit speciali-
111. 768 F.2d at 1454-59.
112. Id. at 1459-62.
113. Id. at 1452 n.39 (citation omitted). This was not the first time the Court has
had trouble articulating the extent of editorial discretion. As Justice Rehnquist ob-
served in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 106 S. Ct. 903, 921
(1986) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting):
In Miami Herald . . . the Court extended negative [first amendment]
rights to newspapers without much discussion. The Court stated that the
right of reply statute . . . "fail[ed] to clear the barriers of the First Amend-
ment because of its intrusion into the function of editors." The Court ex-
plained that interference with "the exercise of editorial control and
judgment" creates a peril for the liberty of the press like government control
over "what is to go into a newspaper." The Court did not elaborate further on




zation. The rules could force a cable editor who desires only to
offer a limited amount of specialized cable programming to re-
transmit a large number of local broadcast stations as well.
That requirement could be regarded as an expensive entry bar-
rier which discourages potential specialized editors from enter-
ing the industry simply to provide consumers with a few
specialized services such as C-SPAN and MTV." 4
On closer inspection, however, the rules do not appear to rep-
resent such a burden because the governmental regulations al-
low cable operators to earn revenues from providing the must-
carry channels. Cable operators can and do charge subscribers
for retransmitting the broadcast signals that the must-carry
rules require them to carry. In fact, rather than a burden, the
retransmission of broadcast stations appears to be a very profit-
able business for cable operators," 5 due at least in part to the
low copyright fees that operators are charged for the use of
broadcast programming under the special compulsory license
provisions of the copyright law."16 Where a government regula-
tion requires a cable operator to offer an additional service at a
profitable rate, the regulation does not represent an economic
burden.
114. The Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN) covers Congressional
and agency hearings as well as other public affairs presentations. The Music TeleVi-
sion network (MTV) presents primarily rock music videos.
115. While consumers might not be willing to pay the real cost of carrying less
popular UHF stations, the total price that consumers are willing to pay for the entire
bundle of must-carry signals appears to make them the most profitable service to pro-
vide in many communities. See Henry, The Economics of Pay-TV Media, in VIDEO
MEDIA COMPETITION: REGULATION, ECONOMICS, AND TECHNOLOGY 21 (E. Noam ed.
1985) (observing that the sale of retransmitted broadcast signals, with the possible
addition of a few advertising-supported cable networks thrown in, together known
as "basic" service, is more profitable to cable operators than the sale of individual pay
services, such as HBO, Showtime, the Disney Channel, and the Playboy Network).
This should not be surprising since the early cable industry designed its pricing to
recover all its costs by serving as a retransmitter of local broadcast signals. See G. K.
WEBB, THE ECONOMICS OF CABLE TELEVISION (1983).
116. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1976) grants cable operators a compulsory copyright license to
retransmit broadcast programs at a regulated rate. Initially, the rate was set artifi-
cially low in deference to the economic plight of the cable industry. See Hatfield &
Garrett, A Reexamination of Cable Television's Compulsory Licensing Royalty Rates,
30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 433, 442-45 (1983). Many commentators consider the
benefit that cable operators receive from this provision to be predicated on the must-
carry rules. See C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, CABLE TELEVISION LAW para. 7.12
[8] at 7-49 to 7-54.1 (1986). Thus, immediately after the repeal of the must-carry rules,
proposals for the repeal of the compulsory license provisions arose. See, e.g., Going to
war over must carry, BROADCASTING, 23-28 (July 29, 1985); Countdown on must carry,
BROADCASTING, 30-34 (Feb. 3, 1986).
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If cable operators in fact could show that the must-carry
rules did represent an uncompensated economic burden to
them,117 the rules could be found to abridge the first amend-
ment in a number of ways. For example, the rules could repre-
sent an unconstitutional discriminatory media tax" 8  in
violation of the Supreme Court's holding in Minneapolis Star
& Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue."9 Im-
posing additional costs to provide cable services would discour-
age some cable operators from entering the business.
Moreover, even if no editors were discouraged from offering
their services to consumers, they would, presumably, pass on
the tax to consumers. Thus, some consumers desiring to re-
ceive the editors' specialized programming might no longer be
able to afford it.
Even under these circumstances, however, the rules could be
constitutional if cable system operators are provided with other
financial benefits, such as direct payments from the govern-
ment which should offset the full cost of the must-carry rules.
If cable operators are fully compensated for the cost of the
rules, the rules would have no effect on the operator's decision
to specialize. The rules do not create any further duties which
might inhibit operators from selecting particular programs or
program services that their customers desire. 20 Even with the
117. A 1984 National Cable Television Association study concluded that the cost of
providing public access channels and other regulatory costs amounted to approxi-
mately $240 to $340 per subscriber over the life of the franchise. W. SHEW, COSTS OF
CABLE TELEVISION FRANCHISE REQUIREMENTS (National Bureau of Economic Re-
search 1984) at 3-4.
118. See Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MAN. SCI. 22, 33-34
(1971). To require cable operators to provide public access channels is comparable to
requiring theater owners to donate some use of their stage or screen to public pur-
poses-for example, two weeks a year or every other Tuesday, or requiring that all
newsstands devote at least eight percent of their shelf space to the distribution of free
leaflets written by local residents.
119. 460 U.S. 575 (1983). This ruling was the basis for striking down a tax on sub-
scription fees of Premier Communications, a multipoint distribution service (micro-
wave pay television service), as a discriminatory tax in City of Alameda v. Premier
Communications Network, 156 Cal. App. 3d 148, 202 Cal.Rptr. 684 (1 Dist.), cert. de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 567 (1984). See also Ripon Cable Co. v. City of Ripon, No. 81-CV-684
(Wisc. Cir. Ct., Fond du Lac County, filed Oct. 12, 1982), discussed in CABLE TV L. &
FINANCE 4 (Aug. 1984).
120. It would be hard to argue that compelled access for local television stations
would "penalize the expression of particular points of view and force [cable operators]
to alter their speech to conform with an agenda they do not set" under the standard
articulated in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 106 S. Ct. 903, 908
(1986), since television households would have easy access to local broadcasters'
messages under any circumstances.
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must-carry rules, cable operators can specialize on as many
other channels as they desire without being burdened by other
duties related to the must-carry channels.
Cable operators might argue that the must-carry rules create
an undue burden for them by forcing them to undertake the
expense of adding additional channels, but this is a disingenu-
ous position. The original must-carry rules were promulgated
in 1966,121 well before most cable systems completed their con-
struction or most recent upgrade. Thus, operators have been
aware of the number of channels required to retransmit must-
carry stations and operators have since had the opportunity to
add as many additional channels as desired for their own se-
lected specialized programming. Underestimation of channel
needs cannot be attributed to the must-carry rules. For exam-
ple, if a cable operator wanted to offer eighteen cable services
in a community and to reserve six additional channels for possi-
ble future needs, it would need at least a twenty-four-channel
system. If government access requirements dictated that it
carry an additional twelve channels of programming services, it
would then build a thirty-six-channel system. If the operator
later found that it wanted a twenty-fifth or twenty-sixth chan-
nel for its own specialized services, it could not claim that the
must-carry rules interfered with its use of the additional chan-
nels, since these channels would not have been constructed re-
gardless of the must-carry rules. 22
One might also consider the must-carry channels from an-
other perspective. Suppose a government body decided to build
its own twelve-channel cable system to improve local broadcast
television reception for its citizens, just as it might construct a
new subway system to improve transportation services. Since
the construction of a cable system is extremely costly, requiring
streets to be dug up and wires to be strung on telephone lines, it
would make economic sense for the government body to negoti-
ate with a private cable franchisee to construct the government
system at the same time that it was constructing its private
system.
121. See supra note 110.
122. As it is only practical to add channel capacity in bundles of multiple channels
(e.g., a 12-channel cable), an operator at full capacity, who does not find expansion to
be cost effective, may feel that its obligation to carry must-carry stations is preventing
it from carrying more desirable channels. Yet this problem is created by the technol-
ogy, not the must-carry rules.
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Moreover, since it is generally more efficient for multiple
users to share coaxial cables than to use physically separate
cables,123 it would make economic sense for both the govern-
ment and the cable operator to share cables. If the govern-
ment's share of construction costs were covered by the monthly
payments made by subscribers for programming carried on the
must-carry channels, then the construction of the government
channels could be seen as having no effect on the cable opera-
tor's ability to satisfy the specialized desires of its subscribers
on its channels. This situation is comparable to that created by
the must-carry rules. From this perspective it is clear that
cable operators actually provide two distinct transmission serv-
ices: (1) transmission of cable services chosen by the cable oper-
ator; and (2) transmission of local broadcast stations under a
government contract. Clearly, the governmental requirement
need not inhibit the cable operator's discretionary judgments
concerning the use of its own channels.
Interestingly, the rules could interfere with the subscriber's
right to enjoy specialization (as opposed to the operator's right
to specialize) if the rules required subscribers to purchase ac-
cess to the must-carry channels before they could gain access to
the cable operator's specialized set of programs. In fact, the
governmentally imposed must-carry rules did not go that far.
The requirement to subscribe to receive local stations before
being able to buy specialized services, as imposed by most if not
all cable systems,124 is the result of a marketing and organizing
choice by cable operators.
(b) Evaluating, Labeling, and Screening
The must-carry rules do not prevent cable operators from
helping consumers select what to watch and, in particular,
what to screen out. As noted above, guides used to provide such
judgments are unaffected by the must-carry rules. Not only
can editors warn consumers to avoid particular messages sched-
uled for the must-carry channels, but editors can also recom-
123. It is more efficient to distribute 56 channels over a single one or two coaxial
cable system than to build two separate 28 channel systems. The single system per-
mits one to dig ditches or hang wires once rather than twice and permits the sharing
of maintenance and other costs. See B. OWEN & P. GREENHALGH, COMPETITIVE POL-
ICY CONSIDERATIONS IN CABLE TELEVISION FRANCHISING (Economists, Inc., revised
1984).
124. For a discussion of the tiering strategies of cable operators, see G.K. WEBB,
supra note 115, at 101-24 (1983).
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mend the use of lock boxes for consumers who would like to
exclude any or all of the services provided on the must-carry
channels.125 Thus, cable operators can provide a screening ser-
vice to those subscribers who desire it, while other subscribers
can rely on the screening services of the editors of the must-
carry stations. Therefore, the must-carry rules do not interfere
with the cable subscriber's ability to receive desired eval-
uations.
(c) Organizing
Finally, the must-carry rules do not interfere with the way
cable operators organize their programming to help subscribers
find the programs they are looking for quickly and easily. The
addition of separate must-carry channels in no way affects op-
erators' ability to present any editorial service on the channels
they control. They may designate channels as solely for chil-
dren's programming or sexually suggestive "adult" program-
ming, or they can mix the two.
In summary, assuming that the carriage of must-carry sta-
tions imposes no undue or uncompensated economic burden on
the cable operator, the must-carry rules do not interfere with
an operator's ability to provide editorial services desired by con-
sumers and protected by the first amendment. The must-carry
rules do not interfere with a cable operator's ability to select
and offer whatever specialized programming consumers prefer,
or to evaluate and identify those programs it carries. Nor do
the must-carry rules prevent operators from helping subscrib-
ers find whatever type of programming those subscribers de-
sire. Thus, under the framework proposed here, must-carry
rules need not be unconstitutional as an interference with edi-
torial freedom.
Editors may argue that the must-carry rules violate their
freedom of association or their right not to speak 126 by requir-
ing them to carry stations and programs that espouse certain
points of view, such as religious, indecent, or violent program-
ming. Editors may charge that economic as well as emotional
damage results when they are forced to associate with material
which might harm their reputation. Although this point is not
frivolous and warrants a more detailed response, the use of dis-
125. See supra note 103.
126. See supra notes 13-14.
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claimers can eliminate any significant damage to the cable op-
erator's first amendment rights. If disclaimers were not
sufficient to eliminate such first amendment infirmities, then
governmental regulations requiring telephone companies to act
as common carriers (and indirectly associate with the messages
of all users-including, for example, dial-a-porn1 27 services)
would violate the first amendment editorial freedom of those
media owners.
The Supreme Court addressed the problem of unwanted as-
sociation by private property owners with the speech of third
parties in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins.2 ' In Prune-
Yard, private shopping mall owners argued that the require-
ment that they permit leafletters on their property violated
their right not to speak, as enunciated in Wooley v. May-
nard.129 The Court, however, held that, with posted disclaim-
ers, it was unlikely that patrons of the mall would mistake the
message of the leafletters for that of the mall owners.
2. Public Access Channels
Cable television franchise agreements often require cable op-
erators to offer public access channels as a kind of electronic
soap box for the community. 30 Despite congressional authori-
zation,' 3 ' these rules have been subject to a number of first
amendment challenges.3 2 Under the framework proposed
127. Common carriers are required to "furnish ... communication service [by wire]
upon reasonable request." 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982). Thus, they must provide service
to dial-a-porn services. See Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC (Carlin I), 749 F.2d
113, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1984) and Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC (Carl II), 787 F.2d
848 (2nd Cir. 1986) (finding unconstitutional federal regulations which attempted to
restrict, but not prohibit, dial-a-porn).
128. 447 U.S. 74 (1979).
129. Id. at 86-87 (discussing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)).
130. For a short early history of public access channels, see B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC ACCESS 207-16 (1976); Price & Morris, Public Access Chan-
nels: The New York City Experience, in SLOAN, supra note 36, app. C at 229 (1971).
For a more recent update, see K. BECK, CULTIVATING THE WASTELAND (1983).
131. 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1985).
132. See Berkshire Cablevision of R.I. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983),va-
cated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985); Connecticut Cable Television Association v.
O'Neill (D. Conn., filed Aug. 13, 1984),cited in CABLE TELEVISION L. & FINANCE 5
(Oct. 1984). Although section 611 of the Cable Act, 47 U.S.C. § 31 (1984), expressly
permits franchising authorities to impose such access requirements, it is not within
the power of Congress to determine whether the requirements abridge the first
amendment rights of cable operators.
The Supreme Court struck down the cable access rules in FCC v. Midwest Video
Corp. (Midwest Video I), 440 U.S. 689 (1979), but that holding was based on statutory
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above, public access channel requirements are similar to the
must-carry rules. Public access channel requirements do not
interfere with a cable operator's ability to provide consumers
with evaluation, labeling, and screening, or organization serv-
ices, but they may interfere with gathering and specializing
services.
The rules may inhibit an operator's ability to offer consumers
specialized services for the same economic reason that the
must-carry rules might inhibit operators. That is, the public ac-
cess channel requirement entails the significant costs of con-
structing and maintaining public access channels.133 These
additional costs may discourage some potential cable editors
from entering the industry or discourage some consumers from
subscribing to services they otherwise would have been able to
afford.
Yet the costs of public access requirements need not neces-
sarily lead to the higher prices which in turn discourage sub-
scribers from subscribing to desired specialized cable services.
Some of the costs of public access are recovered by operators in
other ways. First, some portion, albeit small, of the revenues
that subscribers pay for basic cable service can be allocated to
public access channels. Second, the goodwill that the access
channels generate may represent a valuable asset to the cable
operator."'
More significantly, the cost of public access channels may not
affect the prices charged by cable operators, but may simply di-
minish the profits earned by the cable operator. This was the
result that the FCC hoped to encourage when it limited the
percentage of annual revenues that municipalities could charge
cable system operators as an annual franchise fee.13 5 The FCC
hoped that municipalities would extract any additional
franchise fee in the form of innovative public services, particu-
grounds. Id. at 696-97. The only reference to the first amendment was a footnote
observing that the first amendment claims were "not frivolous." Id. at 709 n.19.
133. See supra note 117.
134. Those in the community who use the public access channels, usually by pro-
ducing original programming, or watching friends, children, or other local events, are
likely to feel good about the cable system operator, encourage others to subscribe to
cable, and be among the most vocal and influential when the community decides
whether to renew the cable operator's franchise term.
135. See Clarification of Cable Rules and Notice of Proposed Rule Making and In-
quiry, 46 F.C.C.2d 175, paras. 113-16 at 206 (1974). However, the FCC was interested in
protecting cable operators against excessive franchise fees that would "siphon the lim-
ited available capital for cable development .... ." Id at para. 114.
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larly public access channels.136
It is unclear whether the first amendment permits the gov-
ernment to charge media owners a substantial license fee to
communicate, even if the fee is used to subsidize communica-
tion by others. In Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc.
v. Metropolitan Transit Authority,137 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that a government body could charge a
license fee exceeding its actual costs when the service it was
licensing was not traditionally provided by the government. It
is not clear whether that holding squares with the Supreme
Court's decision in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minne-
sota Commissioner of Revenue, 38 which prohibits any tax
which unjustly discriminates against the press.
3 9
If the first amendment permits a municipality to charge a
cable system owner a large in-kind franchise fee payable, at
least in part, in the form of public access channels, then the
public access channel requirement would not interfere with the
cable operator's ability to specialize. Public access channels
would not interfere with a cable editor's ability to offer con-
sumers a specialized set of channels at regular prices. Since the
public access channel requirements do not interfere with the
editor's ability to provide either evaluation, labeling, and
screening services or organizing services-because, as with the
must-carry rules, the cable operator can act freely on as many
of its own channels as it likes-the rules would not abridge the
editorial discretion protected by the first amendment.
In summary, a public access channel requirement would hin-
der editorial freedom only if it represents a significant eco-
nomic burden on cable operators that is not otherwise offset.
Even then, however, the harm could be cured if the franchising
authority compensated the cable operator for the net cost of
public access channels-through a direct payment, an offset of
136. Id. at 116-17.
137. 745 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1984). The court held that the government could charge a
profit-maximizing license fee for the use of publicly owned space, if the space was
related to the provision of a service which was traditionally provided by private sector
firms which would have been permitted to charge such fees. Id. at 774-75.
138. 460 U.S. 575 (1983). The case concerned a special ink tax that permitted news-
paper publishers to be taxed at a lower rate than the general business tax, from which
ink was exempt. Id. at 778. Despite the beneficial effect the tax had on publishers,
the Court focused only on the point that the ink tax discriminated against newspaper
publishers.
139. Id. at 593-94.
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other valid fees, or by permitting the operator to charge public
access users.
3. Common Carrier Leased Access Structures
Section 612 of the 1984 Cable Act 14° imposes some common
carrier-type obligations on cable operators.14' The section re-
quires operators of cable systems with more than thirty-five
channels to set aside approximately ten to fifteen percent of
those channels for the use of unaffiliated program suppliers/
editors at reasonable rates. 42
Although section 612 itself may be difficult, if not close to
impossible, to enforce, the leased access concept can be consid-
ered in theory. If common carrier or leased access provisions
are defined as access regulations that require cable operators to
lease some portion of their channels to others at a cost-based
access fee, the cable operator retaining no editorial control over
the content of those channels, then such provisions would not
interfere with protected editorial discretion. 43 Leased access
rules would not interfere with the cable operator's ability to
provide its separate editorial services any more than the must-
carry rules or the public access channel requirements do. The
leased access rules would not affect the editorial choices made
by the operator for the channels under its own control. More-
over, since access users would pay the full cost of their leased
access channels, the leased access rules, by definition, would
140. 47 U.S.C. § 532 (1985).
141. The Communications Act defines a common carrier as "any person engaged as
a common carrier for hire .... " 47 U.S.C. § 153(h)(1982). Originally common carrier
regulations were imposed on any business which held itself out to serve the general
public, apparently in response to a finding of market power in an essential service.
See Deregulation of Telecommunications Services, Further Notice of Proposed Rule
Making, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, app. B at paras. 1-47 (1981).
Under a common carrier model, cable operators would be required to "hold them-
selves out to serve all comers," 47 U.S.C. § 153 (1982), as must telephone common
carriers. Thus, any program supplier willing to pay the cable operator's announced
tariff would have to be carried. A partial common carrier model requires cable opera-
tors to act as common carriers for some of its channels.
142. See 47 U.S.C. § 532 (1982). The provision requires that such cable systems take
the number of channels which they have activated, subtract the number of channels
being used to satisfy other government regulations (e.g., the must-carry rules or pub-
lic access rules), and designate 10 to 15 percent of the remaining channels for commer-
cial leased (i.e., common carrier) access.
143. This author has proposed such a common carrier scheme, and it would not
require rate regulation. See Nadel, COMCAR" A Marketplace Cable Television
Franchise Structure, 20 HARV. J. ON LEG. 541, 561 (1983).
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not place the same economic burdens on the operator as might
the must-carry rules or public access channel requirements.
In summary, the ability of cable operators to provide editorial
services to consumers is not hindered by the must-carry rules,
the public access channel requirements, or the leased access
provisions. Nonetheless, the first two would not survive first
amendment scrutiny if they represented economic burdens to
cable operators. Leased access provisions, which entail no eco-
nomic burden on the cable operator, on the other hand, are in-
herently consistent with the first amendment.
More importantly, if leased access channels are available in
sufficient quantity to satisfy demand, they ensure that editors
other than the cable franchisee are also able to provide con-
sumers with editorial services. The availability of such chan-
nels protects the editorial discretion protected by the first
amendment in its broadest sense.
4. The Fairness Doctrine
Among the public interest obligations imposed on broadcast-
ers are the two duties dictated by the fairness doctrine. 4 4 A
licensee must: (1) devote a reasonable amount of its program-
ming to controversial issues of public importance; and (2) pro-
vide a balanced presentation of contrasting viewpoints on these
issues. 145 The political editorializing rule, a corollary regula-
tion, requires broadcasters who endorse or oppose political can-
didates to offer reasonable time for responses by opposing
candidates. 146 Since the first part of the fairness doctrine
duty--devoting a reasonable amount of time to important pub-
lic issues-is almost never enforced, 147 the focus here will be on
144. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of the fairness doctrine, see Notice of
Inquiry, 49 Fed. Reg. 20,317, 20,319-22 (May 14, 1984); S. SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS Doc-
TRINE AND THE MEDIA (1978). For a discussion of the application of the doctrine to
cable television, see Amendment of the Commission's Rules Concerning the Fairness
Doctrine and Political Cablecasting Requirements for Cable Television Systems, No-
tice of Proposed Rule Making in Docket No. 83-381, FCC 83-130, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,472
(1983).
145. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969); Report on the
Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Stan-
dards of the Communications Act, Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974).
146. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930 (1984).
147. See, e.g., Chamberlin, The FCC and the First Principle of the Fairness Doc-
trine: A History of Neglect and Distortion, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 361 (1979); Comment,
Enforcing the Obligation to Present Controversial Issues: the Forgotten Half of the




The balance requirement has been severely criticized by
broadcasters and commentators alike for creating a chilling ef-
fect on editorial expression and discretion. 148  It clearly
abridges protected editorial discretion under the analysis
above. One need go no further than to observe that the fairness
doctrine inhibits broadcasters'/editors' abilities to specialize-
to present some of the specialized viewpoints that they might
consider most interesting to their audiences-for fear of violat-
ing the doctrine or losing their license or, more likely, of having
to spend significant time and money to produce opposing pro-
gramming or to litigate charges of violating the doctrine.
Although the Supreme Court found that such fears were
merely speculative when it upheld the fairness doctrine in Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,'49 the FCC recently documented
a number of instances where the fairness doctrine did inhibit
the broadcast of particular messages.'5 ° In addition, many
broadcast editors are reluctant to broadcast issue-oriented
commercials or to endorse candidates' 5' because the fairness
doctrine imposes a duty on them to adequately present the
other side at the broadcaster's own expense.
52
148. See supra note 33. But see Steir, The Struggle for TV's First Amendment
Rights, VIEW 39 (Jan. 1984) (reporting that, according to an informal survey of group-
owned stations, the doctrine did not appear to have any significant chilling effects in
practice).
149. 395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969). Nevertheless, the court did not find that the chilling
effect of a right-of-reply statute was too speculative to recognize when it decided
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
150. See Fairness Doctrine Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, at paras. 39-64 (1985). Mean-
while, the Supreme Court has hinted that it would accept a decision by legislators or
regulators to repeal the doctrine. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,
376-78 nn.11 & 12 (1984).
151. According to a study by the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), only
three percent of stations endorse candidates and only 45 percent reported editorializ-
ing in any form since 1980. See NAB, Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Com-
ments in Petition for Rule Making to Repeal and/or Modify the Personal Attack and
Political Editorializing Rules, RM-3739 (Jan. 10, 1983), cited in F. ROWAN, supra note
30, at 147; Fairness Doctrine Inquiry, Report and Order, 74 F.C.C.2d 163, para. 33
(1979) ("few broadcasters routinely accept paid editorial advertisements"); F. ROWAN,
supra note 30, at 154-55; Lee, The Problems of "Reasonable Access" to Broadcasting for
Noncommercial Expression: Content Discrimination, Appellate Review, and Separa-
tion of Commercial and Noncommercial Expression, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 348, 348-53
(1982).
152. Broadcasters must offer free time to opposing parties who cannot afford to
pay for it. Cullman Broadcasting Co., Inc., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963). As one witness before
the House Communications Subcommittee explained, the right to editorialize, when
tied to an obligation to provide equal time, was really no right at all. See Hearings on
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In fact, the FCC almost never second guesses the discretion-
ary judgments of broadcasters on questions of balance.'53 Still,
rather than risk being taken to court, most broadcasters simply
refuse to grant access to advertisers presenting controversial
messages and avoid producing or broadcasting controversial
programming themselves.'54 Hence, the fairness doctrine
clearly interferes with the ability of broadcast editors to offer
specialized programming to audiences.
The fairness doctrine does not prevent broadcasters from
evaluating and labeling materials to aid consumers. Broadcast-
ers may editorialize to identify their own position on issues, 55
labeling opposing viewpoints as editorial replies. Alternatively,
they may refrain from comment or issue disclaimers concern-
ing issues about which they prefer to keep their views private.
But the fairness doctrine may interfere with broadcasters' abili-
ties to protect their audiences from programming that might be
found offensive by some, by excluding it.
For example, ardent Zionists cannot be sure that they will
not be confronted by programming sympathetic to the Palestin-
ian Liberation Organization (PLO) when they turn on their tel-
evision sets, and devout Christian Fundamentalists cannot be
sure that they will not hear discussions about homosexual life-
H.R. 3333 before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol II, Pt.1 at 555 (1979), cited in
Kokalis, Updating the Communications Act: New Electronics, Old Economics, and
the Demise of the Public Interest, 3 COMM/ENT L.J. 455, 495-96 n.250 (1981). The
Supreme Court upheld the right of broadcasters to refuse paid editorial ads in cer-
tain circumstances. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 131-33 (1973).
153. In Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973),
the Supreme Court held that a broadcaster is allowed "significant journalistic discre-
tion" in deciding how to fulfill its obligations under the fairness doctrine. Id. at 111.
Thus, the Commission has stated that: "Unless clearly unreasonable, editorial deci-
sions [concerning obligations under the fairness doctrine] will not be disturbed." In re
Energy Action Committee, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 64 F.C.C.2d 787,
para. 35 at 797 (1977). In fact, according to two longtime FCC observers: "When peti-
tioners have alleged a station hasn't not been meeting its public service obligations in
programming, but no question of racial discrimination has been raised, the Commis-
sion usually cites its philosophy of leaving program judgments to the licensee's dis-
cretion." B. COLE & M. OETTINGER, RELUCTANT REGULATORS: THE FCC AND THE
BROADCAST AUDIENCE 220 (1978). Of 10,301 fairness doctrine complaints received by
the FCC in 1980, the agency found cause in only 28 to even ask broadcasters to re-
spond, and only six led to admonitions against the stations. F. ROWAN, supra note 30,
at 51, 92 (1984). Nevertheless, informal efforts to secure enforcement appear to be
effective. Id. at 71-88.
154. See supra note 150.
155. Even public broadcasters are entitled to editorialize, FCC v. League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
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styles when they turn on their radios. Although some audience
members might prefer to rely on a broadcast editor to screen
out undesirable material, broadcasters cannot guarantee that
their entire program schedule will be free of messages poten-
tially offensive to some. Thus, some particularly sensitive con-
sumers may avoid the broadcast media altogether.
Yet the doctrine does not interfere with a broadcaster's or a
cablecaster's ability to provide a type of screening service by
carefully scheduling programs. The fairness doctrine does not
require that all viewpoints on an issue be presented in each pro-
gram;156 a broadcaster can present one viewpoint on one eve-
ning and another opinion on a different night with explicit
warnings for viewers who might prefer to avoid one or both
programs. Even with the protections of carefully written pro-
gramming guides and lock out devices, the danger still exists
that children or adults might accidentally hear or view such of-
fensive programming. That danger, however, could be re-
garded as one of the costs of having a strong first amendment.
Thus, even where broadcast or cable editors can protect their
audiences from undesired and offensive messages by schedul-
ing and warnings, the fairness doctrine nevertheless hinders
their ability to present specialized editorial services because of
the cost and uncertainty of ensuring adequate balance. The
doctrine also may require a broadcaster or cable operator to
present a viewpoint that it would otherwise wish to exclude.
While this abridgement of the first amendment might be toler-
able if no less burdensome alternatives existed, the existence of
the less drastic leased access/common carrier structure dis-
cussed above157 suggests that the fairness doctrine is unaccept-
ably restrictive.
5. Right-of-Reply Statutes
For reasons that include the encouragement of balanced de-
bate, many countries have imposed access regulations which re-
quire publishers to grant a right of reply to those attacked in
published stories."'8 While the system appears to work ade-
156. See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 717 F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1983); American
Security Council, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 94 F.C.C.2d 521, 521-22 (1983);
Public Media Center, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 494, 512 (1976),
remanded, 587 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1978), on remand 72 F.C.C.2d 776 (1979).
157. See supra note 143 and text accompanying notes 140-43.
158. Since the enactment of art. 13 of the Law of July 29, 1881, a "right of re-
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quately in those countries,159 the Florida version of that law
was voided by a unanimous Supreme Court in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo. 6 0 The Supreme Court held that the
Florida right-of-reply statute was unconstitutional because it
"exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper, "161
and threatens to "dampe[n] the vigor and limi[t] the variety of
public debate. ' 162 Right-of-reply statutes have also been struck
down in other state courts.
163
Under the analysis proposed above, a right-of-reply statute
has almost the identical effect on editorial freedom as does the
fairness doctrine. It can inhibit editors from providing consum-
ers with specializing and screening services.6 It discourages
editors from presenting controversial stories because of the po-
sponse" has been available in France for persons who believe that their reputations
have been injured by a statement in the written press. The people mentioned in a
news article are the sole judges of whether they have been injured, and they can re-
quire a newspaper to print their response to the defamatory language. Meyerson, The
Pursuit of Pluralism: Lessons of the New French Audiovisual Communications Law,
21 STAN. INTL L.J. 95, 108 nn. 99-100 (1985) (citing Toulemon, Le Droit de Reponse et
la Television, LA GAZETTE DU PALAIS-DOCTRINE 393, 394 (1975)). See also PRESS
LAW IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 214, 248-49, 293 (P. Lahav ed. 1985) (discussing the
right of reply in Germany, Sweden, and Israel, respectively).
159. The importance of this right is so well accepted in France that one commenta-
tor described it as "the principle that has long been recognized as necessary for the
protection of public and private liberty." Bouissou, Le State de L'Office de Radiodiffu-
sion-Television Francaise (ORTF), 80 R.D.P. 1109, 1196 (1964). It has been hailed as
"an excellent law which established a reasonable balance between the freedom of
thought and the rights of others." Toulemon, supra note 158, at 393.
In 1972, a more narrowly drawn right of response was extended to radio and televi-
sion. Art. 8 of the Law of July 3, 1972. The ground rules for it were laid out in Decree
No. 75-341 of May 13, 1975. See Meyerson, supra note 158.
160. 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). See FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1982) (repealed 1975).
161. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256.
162. Id. at 257 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)). See
also Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 n.82 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
829 (1977).
163. Recently, an Ohio retraction statute was struck down on constitutional
grounds. Beacon Journal v. Landsdowne, 11 Media L. Rptr. 1094, 1096 (Ohio Ct. of
Common Pleas 1984). Earlier, "a Mississippi right-of-reply statute, MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 3175 (1942) (now MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-3-35 (1972)), was essentially overturned in
Manasco v. Walley, 216 Miss. 614, 63 So.2d 91 (1953). In 1969, Nevada repealed its
right-of-reply statute, Law of April 14, 1969, ch. 310, § 10 (1969), repealing NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.570 (1963)." Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward A
Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 U. MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 n.10, 18 n.57
(1976) (Code section 23-3-35 has since been repealed by 1986 MiSS. LAWS ch. 495,
§ 333).
164. This flaw could be remedied, however, by modifying the law to grant a paid




tential obligation to provide free coverage of opposing view-
points, significantly increasing the cost of presenting the first
story.
Right-of-reply statutues also have an impact similar to the
fairness doctrine on evaluating, labeling, and screening serv-
ices. Editors could indicate their opinions about the program-
ming, but right-of-reply statutes would hinder the ability of
editors to protect their audiences from offensive messages. In
addition, if the statute required the reply to appear in a position
or time comparable to that of the original story, the statute
would interfere with an editor's right to schedule or organize
his programming. Thus, right-of-reply statutes would abridge
the editorial discretion protected by the first amendment.
C. Exclusive Cable Television Franchise Awards
The access requirements discussed above were analyzed from
the perspective of the cable operator. The question examined
was whether, by requiring the operator to provide access, the
regulations interfere with the editorial discretion of the broad-
caster. The analysis of exclusive franchise awards is ap-
proached from the opposite perspective. The question
presented is whether the grant of a single franchise interferes
with the protected editorial discretion of one seeking to express
ideas or provide editorial services.
In Preferred Communications v. City of Los Angeles,'65 the
Ninth Circuit evaluated an allegation that the Los Angeles
cable television franchising procedures violated the first
amendment rights of a prospective cable operator by permit-
ting only a single firm to get the city franchise. 66 The court
noted that, although the franchise agreement required the suc-
cessful applicant to provide unsuccessful applicants with a
right of access to the system via mandatory and leased access
channels, the franchise procedure still abridged the first
amendment rights of unsuccessful applicants.
167
The court held that, by denying an applicant a franchise, the
city denied the applicant the right to exercise its editorial dis-
cretion to "[a]rrang[e] programming for an entire cable televi-
sion system,"'68 and, further, that "cable television operators
165. 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), remanded, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986).
166. Id. at 1401.
167. Id. at 1409-10.
168. Id. at 1410.
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exercise considerable editorial discretion regarding what their
programming will include.1 69 Therefore, the court held that
the franchising procedure was unconstitutional. 70 On appeal,
the Supreme Court remanded the decision to the district court
to resolve the factual assertions of the parties. 71
Under the framework proposed here, the Los Angeles
franchising procedures would abridge editorial freedom be-
cause, although they guaranteed some access to nonlicensees,
they did not ensure that adequate access would be provided.
Without adequate access, the provision of desired editorial serv-
ices might be hindered as noted below. Nevertheless, the
award of an exclusive cable television franchise which guaran-
teed adequate access to those speakers without a franchise
could well survive constitutional scrutiny. For franchise agree-
ments to avoid hindering the provision of protected editorial
services, they must guarantee that access channels be available
to other desirous cable editors at reasonable (cost-based)
prices17 2 and in quantities sufficient to meet demand.
If an exclusive franchise agreement required the franchisee
to provide enough capacity to meet the demand of all nonlicen-
sees who were willing to pay a cost-based price, then the
franchising procedures would further the goals of free expres-
sion. Such procedures would assure media access to anyone
able to afford the cost-based price of access, without necessarily
hindering the franchisee's ability to provide any of its own edi-
torial services.
Assuming that unsuccessful franchise applicants could se-
cure access to an adequate number of channels at cost-based
rates, they could also search and gather the specialized set of
programming they desired to offer and disseminate it over
leased channels. Lack of actual ownership of, or control over,
169. Id. at 1410 n.10.
170. Id. at 1411.
171. 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986).
172. There is no first amendment problem if access is available at a cost-based
price. However, if the cost of access is unreasonable, access seekers might complain
that the portion of the rate above actual costs unconstitutionally hinders their ability
to disseminate messages or editorial services.
Where cable is a natural monopoly, however speakers would not normally have the
option of securing lower rates by constructing their own cable systems. For an excel-
lent discussion of why cable television transmission might not be a natural monopoly
or why, even if it were, it might not be good public policy to award exclusive franchise
licenses, see T. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Interest: An Economic
Analysis of the Cable Television Franchise, 134 U. PENN. L. REV. 1335 (1986).
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distribution systems need not inhibit their ability to communi-
cate any more than the government-granted monopolies in
first-class mail delivery173 and local telephone service 174 inter-
fere with the free expression of those who use the mail or tele-
phones. Cable subscribers could still receive the specialized
programming offered by any editor who desired to make such
programming available.
Unsuccessful franchise applicants who lease channels could
also evaluate and identify programming for subscribers without
owning or controlling a system as a whole. After evaluating all
of the programming carried on the cable system, the unsuccess-
ful applicant could recommend specific programming as well as
warn consumers about channels or particularly offensive pro-
grams to avoid. The unsuccessful applicant could communicate
these evaluations and identifications to subscribers via separate
cable channels, newspapers, competing cable guide magazines,
newsletters, radio, television, or even telephone.
Using those same media, unsuccessful franchise applicants
could also offer organizing services to consumers by helping
them locate desired programs quickly and easily. Competing
editors could tell subscribers exactly where and when to find
the best programs for children, working women, sports enthu-
siasts, senior citizens, or those hungry for financial data.
The award of an exclusive cable franchise, then, need not
abridge the rights of consumers to utilize the editorial services
of unsuccessful cable franchise applicants. Evaluation, label-
ing, and screening services, and organizational services can be
provided to consumers efficiently where adequate access rules
ensure that consumers are able to receive the programs recom-
mended by editors other than those with exclusive franchises.
Adequate access for unsuccessful cable applicants would give
subscribers the opportunity to consider the opinions of multiple
competing cable editors.
173. See 18 U.S.C. § 1696 (1982); 39 U.S.C. §§ 601, 604 (1982). See also National Ass'n
of Letter Carriers v. Independent Postal Sys. of America, Inc., 470 F.2d 265 (10th Cir.
1972).
174. See 47 U.S.C. § 203(c) (1982). See also Capital Tel. Co. v. City of Schenectady,
560 F. Supp. 207 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).
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Conclusion
Editorial freedom is best understood as the right of consum-
ers to receive those editorial/retail services which enable them
to receive messages effectively. It is the right of viewers and
listeners to receive messages which is paramount. An examina-
tion of the role of editors in the marketplace indicates that they
provide consumers with three particularly valuable and impor-
tant editorial services: (1) searching, gathering, and specializ-
ing; (2) evaluating, labeling, and screening; and (3) organizing
messages. Therefore, in protecting the rights of information
consumers, the first amendment right of editorial freedom
should protect the rights of editors who offer these services.
Under this framework of analysis, both the fairness doctrine
and right-of-reply statutes abridge editorial freedom because
they hinder the ability of editors to specialize according to the
desires of consumers, and may hinder efforts to screen out of-
fensive messages. The must-carry rules and public access chan-
nel requirements may also interfere with protected editorial
discretion when they impose an economic burden on cable op-
erators seeking to specialize. Absent such an economic burden,
they would not interfere with editorial freedom.
Exclusive cable franchise licenses interfere with the ability
of unsuccessful franchise applicants to exercise the editorial
discretion protected by the first amendment, unless those ap-
plicants are guaranteed an adequate right of access at cost-
based prices. The only way of ensuring adequate access is to
require cable system owners to provide enough leased access
channels to satisfy market demand as under a common carrier
structure. Such a duty would neither hinder the efforts of
cable operators to offer any of the editorial services protected
by the first amendment's editorial freedom nor would it pre-
vent consumers from receiving additional editorial services
from editors who do not have cable franchise licenses. Rather,
it would ensure that access to the cable television medium is
available on the same basis as that of the print medium.
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